Marriage in India is traditionally seen as a sacred union built on faith, endurance, and lifelong companionship. Yet, the ideals of marital sanctity often mask systemic inequality, where women are expected to endure indignity in silence. The recent judgment of the Madurai Bench of the Madras High Court in Indira v. Dhanaseelan (2025) pierces this veil, declaring unequivocally that marriage does not confer absolute control upon a husband, and that a woman’s dignity and autonomy remain inviolable throughout matrimony.
Justice L. Victoria Gowri’s judgment restores conviction under Section 498-A IPC (Section 85 BNS). It affirms maintenance under the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 (DV Act), delivering a powerful message: age cannot sanctify cruelty, and endurance cannot be mistaken for consent.
Background of the Case
The case arose from a marriage solemnised in 1965 between Indira and Dhanaseelan Mudaliyar. After decades of cohabitation, Indira, then an octogenarian, approached the Court alleging mental, physical, and economic cruelty. She accused her husband of developing an illicit relationship with their daughter-in-law, isolating her within the home, denying food, desecrating religious items, and coercing her to bring money from relatives.
When she protested, she was allegedly assaulted and threatened with a knife. A complaint under Section 498-A IPC and Section 506 (ii) IPC was filed in 2007 at the All Women Police Station, Paramakudi.
The Judicial Magistrate convicted Dhanaseelan for cruelty under Section 498-A IPC, but acquitted him of criminal intimidation.
The Fast-Track Court at Paramakudi, in 2017, reversed the conviction. Indira filed an appeal under the victim’s right recognised in the proviso to Section 372 CrPC, leading to this landmark ruling in 2025. Parallelly, proceedings under the DV Act for maintenance culminated in complementary findings reaffirming women’s autonomy and protection under law.
Issues
The High Court examined multiple intertwined questions:
- Whether the husband’s acquittal of cruelty under Section 498-A IPC was legally sustainable.
- Whether the acts of isolation, deprivation, and humiliation constituted “cruelty” within the meaning of Section 498-A IPC.
- Whether an elderly wife living separately was an “aggrieved person” entitled to relief under the DV Act.
- What quantum of maintenance was justified considering the husband’s financial capacity and the wife’s vulnerability?
Findings of the Trial and Appellate Courts
Trial Court (2016)
The Magistrate found Dhanaseelan guilty under Section 498-A IPC, concluding that deliberate denial of food, social isolation, and emotional humiliation amounted to mental cruelty. Considering his age, the Court imposed six months’ simple imprisonment and ₹ 5,000 fine.
First Appellate Court (2017)
The Fast-Track Court set aside the conviction, holding that:
- no independent eyewitnesses supported the prosecution;
- allegations of cruelty were “hearsay”;
- absence of dowry demand rendered Section 498-A inapplicable; and
- mere illicit relationship did not constitute cruelty.
This reasoning reduced the offence to a “domestic misunderstanding.”
High Court (2025)
Justice Gowri rejected the appellate reasoning as perverse and contrary to law. The judgment restores the conviction, observing that expecting eyewitnesses to domestic cruelty “is unrealistic,” and that dowry demand is not a sine qua non for cruelty.
Key Legal Principles Reaffirmed
1. Definition and Scope of Cruelty under Section 498-A IPC
Section 498-A defines cruelty as:
- any wilful conduct likely to cause grave injury or danger to life, limb, or health (mental or physical); or
- harassment intended to coerce the woman or her relatives to meet unlawful demands.
The Court emphasised that “wilful conduct causing grave mental injury” is independently punishable even without dowry demand. Isolation, humiliation, deprivation of necessities, and coercion to fetch money meet this threshold.
2. Hearsay and Domestic Violence
Recognising that most cruelty occurs within closed walls, the Court clarified that corroboration is a matter of prudence, not law. The testimony of a credible victim can sustain conviction. Citing State of H.P. v. Raghubir Singh (1993) and Kalyan Kumar Gogoi v. Ashutosh Agnihotri (2011), it reiterated that domestic offences cannot be measured by the standards of street crimes.
3. Illicit Relationships and Mental Cruelty
While a husband’s extra-marital relationship alone may not constitute cruelty, when coupled with acts of humiliation, denial of food, and isolation, it becomes a source of grave mental injury. The High Court held that Dhanaseelan’s relationship with his daughter-in-law, and his conduct toward the wife, together crossed this threshold.
4. Age No Shield Against Accountability
Rejecting leniency sought on the ground of age, the Court observed that “age cannot sanctify cruelty.” The moral compass of marriage must be guided by compassion, not control.
Analysis of Evidence
The High Court meticulously examined the record:
- Victim’s Testimony: Indira’s account of sustained cruelty—being isolated in a separate kitchen, denied food, and humiliated—was consistent and credible.
- Witness Corroboration: Family friends and relatives (P.Ws 2–5) confirmed circumstances surrounding her deprivation and the police-mediated compromise where the husband agreed to pay ₹ 2,000 monthly and allow phone access—objective proof of prior cruelty.
- Defence Silence: The accused examined no witnesses and offered no documentary rebuttal, reinforcing the prosecution’s case.
Consequently, the High Court restored the conviction under Section 498-A IPC and directed the accused to surrender for sentence.
Restoration of Conviction: Protecting Women’s Dignity
Justice Gowri’s observations transcend the individual case:
“The endurance of women, particularly elderly wives, should no longer be mistaken for consent, nor their silence for acceptance. Marriage cannot justify indignity.”
This pronouncement underscores that the right to dignity under Article 21 of the Constitution extends into the marital home. The Court’s epilogue highlights that legal intervention is not to destroy marriage but to purify it of inequities.
Parallel Proceedings under the DV Act
The same parties contested proceedings under the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act in D.V.O.P. No. 2 of 2017. The Magistrate awarded ₹ 11,000 per month maintenance; the Sessions Court enhanced it to ₹ 20,000, finding evidence of economic abuse. Dhanaseelan challenged this in three connected criminal revisions.
High Court’s Ruling on Maintenance
Justice Gowri upheld the enhanced maintenance based on an Advocate-Commissioner’s report showing:
- Income from lodge and shops exceeding ₹ 1,10,000 per month;
- Wife’s medical and living expenses around ₹ 30,000 per month;
- Sale of her ancestral lands to sustain herself.
Applying Rajnesh v. Neha (2021), the Court ruled that maintenance must be “realistic, not minimal,” ensuring a dignified life consistent with marital standards. ₹ 20,000 was less than 20 percent of the husband’s income and thus reasonable.
Economic Abuse as Continuing Domestic Violence
The judgment adopts a progressive interpretation of “domestic violence,” incorporating economic and emotional neglect. Relying on Krishna Bhattacharjee v. Sarathi Choudhury (2016) and Indra Sarma v. V.K.V. Sarma (2013), the Court affirmed that failure to maintain a spouse is a continuing wrong, giving rise to a recurring cause of action, not barred by limitation.
By recognising deprivation of sustenance as “economic abuse,” the Court expands protection beyond physical harm—aligning with the UN Declaration on the Elimination of Violence against Women (1993) and India’s constitutional commitment to dignity and equality.
Key Observations and Social Message
1. Redefining Marital Responsibility
The Court observed that husbands must recognise the comfort, safety, and dignity of wives as core obligations, not optional gestures. Marriage is “a partnership of equals,” not a license for domination.
2. Autonomy of Elderly Women
The decision is significant for highlighting the plight of elderly women abandoned after lifelong service to family honour. The Court called it a moral duty of society to protect them from domestic neglect, equating such neglect with cruelty.
3. Marriage and Constitutional Morality
The epilogue eloquently links matrimonial justice with constitutional values:
“Protecting octogenarian women within oppressive domestic environments is not merely legal redress but a reaffirmation of the constitutional promise of dignity under Article 21.”
By rooting its reasoning in Article 21, the Court situates marital rights within fundamental human rights, harmonising personal law with constitutional morality.
4. Accountability Beyond Age
The Court’s statement that “conviction is not an act of vengeance but an assertion that age cannot sanctify cruelty” resonates deeply in an era when elderly offenders often seek sympathy. Justice Gowri emphasised accountability over pity.
Conclusion
Indira v. Dhanaseelan stands as a watershed moment in the evolution of marital-cruelty jurisprudence in India. It dismantles the notion that marriage is a domain beyond legal scrutiny, affirming that law protects autonomy even within matrimony.
By restoring conviction under Section 498-A IPC and upholding maintenance under the DV Act, the Madras High Court delivers a strong reminder that the true sanctity of marriage lies not in endurance but in equality.
In Justice Gowri’s own words:
“Cruelty, when persistent and deliberate, corrodes the very sanctity of marriage. The law must intervene not to dismantle the institution, but to purify it of its inequities.”
Through this decision, the judiciary has reaffirmed that women’s dignity within marriage is not negotiable—a message as timeless as the institution it seeks to reform.
Important Link
Law Library: Notes and Study Material for LLB, LLM, Judiciary, and Entrance Exams