The law of limitation is founded on public policy and is intended to ensure that parties do not sleep on their rights. However, courts have discretionary powers to condone delays in filing legal proceedings if “sufficient cause” is shown.
This article delves into the requirement of a “genuine cause” for condonation of delay, drawing from legal principles, judicial precedents, and particularly the 2025 Supreme Court judgment in Thirunagalingam v. Lingeswaran & Anr. (2025), which reaffirmed that delay should not be condoned merely as an act of generosity.
Legal Framework
Section 5, Limitation Act, 1963
“Any appeal or any application, other than an application under any of the provisions of Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, may be admitted after the prescribed period if the appellant or the applicant satisfies the court that he had sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal or making the application within such period.”
The phrase “sufficient cause” is not defined in the Act and is interpreted based on the facts and circumstances of each case.
Judicial Interpretation of “Sufficient Cause”
Broad Judicial Discretion
In Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag v. Mst. Katiji (1987) 2 SCC 107, the Supreme Court emphasised that a liberal approach should be adopted in condonation matters to promote substantial justice.
However, this liberality is not absolute. It must not encourage indolence, negligence, or abuse of process.
Supreme Court Verdict: Thirunagalingam v. Lingeswaran & Anr. (2025)
Background
In this case, the respondents failed to appear in a suit despite being served, leading to an ex parte decree against them in 2017. Their application under Order IX Rule 13 CPC to set aside the decree was filed with significant delays—712 and 467 days—which were initially condoned by the Trial Court but reversed by the High Court and upheld by the Supreme Court.
After this failure, the respondents filed a fresh appeal under Section 96(2) CPC along with an application to condone a delay of 1116 days. The First Appellate Court rejected the plea. However, the High Court condoned the delay, directing the appeal to be decided on merits upon payment of Rs. 1 lakh as cost. This order was challenged in the Supreme Court.
Supreme Court’s Findings
The Supreme Court reversed the High Court’s decision, emphasising the following:
1. Finality of Earlier Findings
- The respondents had already attempted to justify their delay through earlier applications, which were rejected after reaching the Supreme Court.
- They repeated the same grounds in the second round, which the Court held as an “abuse of process.”
2. Requirement of a Bona Fide Explanation
- The Court clarified that condonation is not a matter of charity or equity alone.
- There must be a bona fide, credible, and distinct cause for delay.
3. Incorrect Reliance on Precedents
The High Court wrongly applied N. Mohan v. R. Madhu (2020) 20 SCC 302, where summons had not been served. In the present case, the defendants were served and participated before turning negligent.
4. Abuse of Concurrent Remedies
Condonation under Order IX Rule 13 and Section 96(2) CPC are distinct, but cannot be used interchangeably to re-litigate identical grounds of delay.
5. Reaffirmation of Limitation Principles
The Court cited its past judgments, including:
- Popat Bahiru Govardhane v. Land Acquisition Officer (2013) 10 SCC 765: Limitation law must be strictly enforced.
- Maniben Devraj Shah v. Municipal Corporation of Brihan Mumbai (2012) 5 SCC 157: Courts should not condone delay when no sufficient cause is shown, even if it results in hardship.
Key Observations from the Verdict
1. “Sufficient Cause” Requires More Than Repetition
Merely stating “non-wilful” or “not wanton” delay without substantiating it with new facts or compelling circumstances does not meet the threshold.
2. Generosity Doesn’t Justify Delay
“Delay should not be condoned merely as an act of generosity. The pursuit of substantial justice must not come at the cost of causing prejudice to the opposing party.”
Balancing Procedural Rigour and Substantial Justice
The law seeks to strike a balance between rigid procedural timelines and the aim of rendering justice. While some delay may be inevitable due to human limitations, the courts have increasingly discouraged litigants from using delay condonation as a shield for indifference or tactical advantage.
In State of West Bengal v. Howrah Municipality (1972) 1 SCC 366, the Court observed that “legal diligence” is a prerequisite for invoking equity.
When Delay May Be Justified
Courts have condoned delays where:
- Parties were misled by incorrect legal advice.
- Delay resulted from medical emergencies or natural calamities.
- Administrative errors occurred in government departments [State of Nagaland v. Lipok AO, (2005) 3 SCC 752].
When Delay Is Not Justified
Strategic delays to harass the opposite party.
Repetition of rejected grounds in new proceedings.
Ignorance or negligence without due diligence.
In P.K. Ramachandran v. State of Kerala (1997) 7 SCC 556, the Court rejected a condonation plea and remarked:
“The law of limitation is a substantive law and has definite consequences on the right and obligation of a party… a court has no power to extend the period of limitation on equitable grounds.”
Comparative Note: Section 14 of the Limitation Act
Section 14 allows the exclusion of time spent pursuing another remedy in good faith in a court without jurisdiction. The respondents in Thirunagalingam argued this provision applied. However, the Supreme Court declined to accept it, stating that the reasons had already been adjudicated and rejected.
Implications of the Ruling
- Tightens the threshold for what constitutes “genuine cause.”
- Discourages repetitive litigation.
- Reinforces that limitation law is not discretionary unless cause shown is convincing.
- Clarifies that precedents must match on facts, not just on legal principles.
Conclusion
The Supreme Court’s 2025 decision in Thirunagalingam v. Lingeswaran unequivocally reinforces the principle that delay in legal proceedings cannot be condoned unless backed by genuine, bona fide, and convincingly explained causes. The judiciary is not to be seen as an open gate for the indolent or negligent, and statutory timelines cannot be stretched in the name of justice without showing real cause.
In the absence of a genuine explanation, delay should not be condoned, reaffirming that justice must be fair not just to the applicant, but also to the respondent.
