The offence of obstructing a public servant in the discharge of official duties has long been recognised under Indian criminal law. Section 186 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC), now re-enacted as Section 221 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (BNS), criminalises any voluntary obstruction of a public servant in the discharge of their public functions. The provision is aimed at ensuring the smooth functioning of the state machinery and protecting officials against undue interference.
However, an important interpretive question arises: does “obstruction” require actual physical interference, or can mere threats, intimidation, or passive resistance also fall within its ambit? The recent Supreme Court decision in Devendra Kumar v. State (NCT of Delhi) & Anr., along with earlier precedents, provides clarity.
This article examines the meaning of “obstruction,” the distinction between physical force and threats, judicial interpretations over time, and the implications under both the IPC and the BNS.
Statutory Text: Section 186 IPC and Section 221 BNS
Section 186 IPC:
“Whoever voluntarily obstructs any public servant in the discharge of his public functions, shall be punished with imprisonment … up to three months, or with fine … or with both.”
The maximum fine under the IPC was limited to five hundred rupees.
Section 221 BNS (Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023):
The provision substantially mirrors Section 186 IPC. However, a notable change is that the upper limit of fine has been increased from ₹500 to ₹2,500.
This reflects the legislative intent to update penalties in line with current socio-economic realities, ensuring deterrence remains effective.
The common phrase “voluntarily obstructs” lies at the heart of interpretation.
Facts of the Case: Devendra Kumar v. State (NCT of Delhi)
On 3 October 2013, Ravi Dutt Sharma, a process server at the Nazarat Branch, Shahdara, was assigned the duty of serving warrants and summons to the Station House Officer (SHO) of the Nand Nagri Police Station, Delhi.
- When he reached the police station, a constable received the documents but signed them in the name of another head constable. On objection, the constable struck off the signatures.
- The Reader of the SHO and the Duty Officer refused to accept the summons.
- When the process server approached SHO Devendra Kumar (the petitioner), he was allegedly abused and humiliated. The SHO made him stand with raised hands for half an hour and then sit on the floor for nearly four hours as a form of punishment.
- Despite repeated pleas to allow him to leave and serve other processes, the process server was detained until 4:30 PM when a head constable finally accepted the documents.
The process server reported the matter to the District and Sessions Judge, Shahdara, who directed the Administrative Civil Judge to lodge a complaint under Section 195 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC). Acting on this, the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate (CMM) ordered registration of an FIR against the SHO under Sections 186 (obstructing public servant), 341 (wrongful restraint), and 342 (wrongful confinement) IPC.
Devendra Kumar challenged the order before the Sessions Court and the Delhi High Court, both of which dismissed his plea. He then approached the Supreme Court by way of a special leave petition.
Issues Before the Court
1. Scope of “Obstruction” under Section 186 IPC
- Does obstruction necessitate the use of physical force, or can threats, intimidation, or passive resistance also qualify?
2. Validity of Proceedings under Section 195 CrPC
- Whether the CMM erred in directing police investigation under Section 156(3) CrPC, rather than directly taking cognizance on the complaint filed by the Administrative Civil Judge.
- Whether prosecution under Section 186 IPC was barred without a proper complaint by the concerned public servant.
3. Overlap with Other Offences
- Whether wrongful restraint and confinement (Sections 341 & 342 IPC) could be prosecuted independently, or whether they too were barred by Section 195 CrPC as arising from the same transaction.
4. Judicial Dignity
Whether obstructing a process server amounts not only to a statutory offence but also indirectly to contempt of court, as it interferes with the administration of justice.
Judicial Analysis in Devendra Kumar v. State (NCT of Delhi) (2025)
The Supreme Court adopted a broad interpretation of “obstruction,” clarifying that it is not limited to physical force. Any act—whether threats, intimidation, humiliation, or passive resistance—that makes it harder for a public servant to perform lawful duties amounts to obstruction.
The Court criticised the Magistrate for wrongly directing a police investigation under Section 156(3) CrPC despite a valid complaint from a judicial officer. Under Section 195 CrPC, the Magistrate should have directly taken cognizance, given the sanctity of such complaints.
It also stressed that offences under Section 186 IPC cannot be split from connected offences to bypass Section 195’s safeguards. Since the obstruction involved a process server, the Court underlined the need to protect the dignity of judicial proceedings.
Finally, while upholding the validity of the charges, the Court left the question of guilt to be decided at trial.
Key Highlights of the Decision
Justice J.B. Pardiwala and Justice R. Mahadevan stated:
Under Section 186, the expression “whoever voluntarily obstructs any public servant in the discharge of his public functions” is used and whereas in Section 133 of the Customs Act, 1962 the expression “if any person intentionally obstructs any officer of customs” is used. In our considered opinion, the expression ‘intentionally’ used in Section 133 of the Customs Act and the expression ‘voluntarily’ used in Section 186 of I.P.C. connote the same meaning. The decision of this Court in Collector of Customs (supra) concludes and decides the issue. Therefore, we hold that the expression ‘obstruction’ used in Section 186 of the I.P.C. is not confined to physical obstruction. It need not necessarily be an act of use of criminal force.
The act need not be a violent one. It is enough if the act complained of results in preventing a public servant in discharge of his lawful duties. Any act of causing impediment by unlawfully preventing public servant in discharge of his functions would be enough to attract Section 186 of the I.P.C. Any other interpretation would be to encourage people to take the law into their hands, frustrate the investigation of the crimes and thwart public justice. Such an interpretation cannot be commended by the Courts.
Traditional Understanding: Physical v. Non-Physical Obstruction
Historically, courts struggled with whether obstruction required actual physical interference. Some early rulings restricted the scope:
- Jaswant Singh v. King Emperor (AIR 1925 Lah 139) – Lahore HC held that Section 186 contemplated some “overt act” and not mere passive conduct.
- Phudki v. State (AIR 1955 All 104) – Allahabad HC opined that obstruction required “violence or show of violence,” and mere refusal to submit to arrest was insufficient.
- Janki Prasad Tibrewal v. State of Bihar (1975 Cri LJ 575) – Patna High Court similarly linked obstruction with actual resistance or criminal force.
These cases reflected a narrow approach, limiting obstruction largely to physical acts.
Expansive Judicial Approach: Obstruction Beyond Physical Force
Later courts widened the interpretation:
- Emperor v. Sideman Abba (AIR 1935 Bom 24) and State v. Babulal Gaurishanker Misar (AIR 1957 Bom 10) – Held that threats or show of force preventing execution of official duty constitute obstruction.
- Santosh Kumar Jain v. State (1951 SCR 190) – Blocking access and locking premises, though not involving direct violence, was obstruction.
- Collector of Customs v. Paradip Port Trust (1990) 4 SCC 250 – While construing “obstruction” under Customs Act (analogous to IPC), the Court emphasised that obstruction includes “anything which makes it more difficult for the public servant to carry out duties,” not just physical resistance.
This expansive reading recognised psychological and indirect barriers as valid forms of obstruction.
Constitutional Dimensions
- Right to protest v. obstruction: Peaceful dissent is constitutionally protected under Article 19. However, once conduct crosses into preventing officials from performing lawful functions, it becomes penal.
- Rule of law: The broad reading ensures administrative authority is not undermined.
Conclusion
The Supreme Court in Devendra Kumar v. State (NCT of Delhi) has settled the long-standing debate: obstruction under Section 186 IPC / Section 221 BNS is not confined to physical acts but extends to threats, intimidation, and passive resistance. By adopting this expansive interpretation, the Court has reinforced the authority of public servants and the integrity of judicial processes.
At the same time, the mandatory safeguard of Section 195 CrPC ensures that prosecutions are not launched lightly or vindictively. The decision strikes a balance—empowering public servants while protecting citizens from frivolous prosecution.
In today’s legal framework under the BNS, any act that unlawfully hinders a public servant—whether through physical resistance, verbal threats, or passive defiance—falls within the ambit of obstruction. This ensures that the machinery of governance operates without unlawful hindrance, preserving both the rule of law and the dignity of judicial authority.
Important Link
Law Library: Notes and Study Material for LLB, LLM, Judiciary, and Entrance Exams