In a recent and significant pronouncement, the Allahabad High Court (Lucknow Bench), comprising Justice Rajesh Singh Chauhan and Justice Syed Qamar Hasan Rizvi, clarified the law governing the declaration of marital status in India. The Court categorically held that no individual, authority, or agreement between parties can determine or alter the marital status of a person—a declaration of marriage or nullity can only be made by a competent court under the law.
The judgment came in a recall application in Ketan Rastogi & Others v. State of Uttar Pradesh & Others, Criminal Misc. Writ Petition No. 1314 of 2024, filed by Smt. Mohini Verma, who sought to recall the Court’s earlier order dated 9 January 2025, which had allowed the writ petition following a compromise between the parties.
The case revolved around the intricate issues of conversion, interfaith marriage, and validity of matrimonial status under the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, ultimately leading the Court to reaffirm a foundational legal principle—that marital status lies at the heart of the social order and only a court of law can conclusively determine it.
Factual Background
1. The Marriage and Disputes
The facts were both complex and socially sensitive. The petitioner, Ketan Rastogi, had married Smt. Mohini Verma on 28 June 2020 according to Hindu rites and customs at Ramjanki Dharmshala, Lucknow. However, before this marriage, Mohini Verma had converted to Islam and married one Dr. Zafar Sayeed through Nikah on 6 July 2013, adopting the name Sana Fatima.
Subsequently, she filed for divorce from her first husband in August 2020, which was decreed on 19 January 2021 by the Additional Principal Judge (Family Court), Lucknow. Importantly, there was no record or evidence before the High Court indicating when or how Mohini re-embraced the Hindu faith before marrying Ketan Rastogi. This absence of proof raised a crucial question—could a marriage solemnised under Hindu rites be valid if one of the parties was not a Hindu at the time of marriage?
2. Criminal and Civil Proceedings
Multiple legal proceedings ensued between the parties:
FIRs and Counter-FIRs: Each side filed criminal complaints against the other under various provisions of the IPC and the Dowry Prohibition Act.
Section 11 Petition: Ketan Rastogi filed a petition under Section 11 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, seeking a declaration that the marriage was void ab initio.
Section 13 Petition: Mohini Verma filed for divorce under Section 13 of the same Act.
Amidst these disputes, both parties, with their families and lawyers, executed a compromise deed dated 17 February 2024, agreeing to withdraw all cases and move on with their lives independently.
The compromise explicitly stated that after settlement of the disputes, each party would be free to marry elsewhere, and no one would raise any objection. Based on this settlement, the High Court quashed the FIR vide its order dated 9 January 2025, bringing an apparent end to the criminal proceedings.
3. The Recall Application
However, the story did not end there. Later, the Family Court, Lucknow, by its judgment dated 6 May 2025, dismissed Ketan Rastogi’s petition under Section 11 of the Hindu Marriage Act, holding that he had failed to prove his claim that the marriage was void. Following this, Mohini Verma (the opposite party) filed an application before the High Court seeking to recall the earlier order of 9 January 2025, arguing that this new development had rendered the compromise ineffective and left her marital status in legal uncertainty.
Issues Before the Court
The recall application raised two principal questions:
- Whether the High Court should recall its earlier order passed based on a compromise, in view of the subsequent Family Court judgment dismissing the Section 11 petition; and
- Whether marital status can be conclusively determined by any means other than a judicial declaration by a competent court.
These questions brought into focus the interplay between private settlements and judicial declarations in matters touching marital status.
Court’s Observations
1. Limits of High Court’s Jurisdiction in Writ Proceedings
The Division Bench noted that since the recall application pertained to an order passed under Article 226 of the Constitution, its scope was limited. The High Court observed that questions relating to marital status and the validity of marriage fall squarely within the jurisdiction of family courts, and not within the purview of a writ proceeding.
The Bench declined to delve into factual disputes, especially regarding religious conversion or the validity of the marriage, emphasising that such determinations must be made by a competent civil or family court, not by the High Court in its writ jurisdiction.
2. Statutory Framework: Section 11 and Section 5 of the Hindu Marriage Act
The Court reproduced Section 11 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, which defines void marriages, and Section 5(i), which lays down that a valid Hindu marriage requires both parties to be Hindus and that neither should have a living spouse at the time of marriage.
A marriage that violates these conditions is void ipso jure, i.e., void from its inception, and such a marriage does not alter or affect the status of the parties or confer any rights or obligations normally arising from a valid marriage. The Court drew from established precedents to underline that even if a marriage is void, the declaration to that effect must come from a competent court.
3. Reliance on Supreme Court Precedents
The judgment draws extensively from landmark Supreme Court rulings clarifying the legal status of void marriages:
- Yamunabai Anantrao Adhav v. Anantrao Shivram Adhav (1988) 1 SCC 530): The Supreme Court held that a marriage contracted while a spouse from an earlier marriage is still alive is void ipso jure—automatically void from inception—and can be ignored in law without a formal declaration. However, this principle applies only when there is no factual dispute about the subsistence of the earlier marriage
- M.M. Malhotra v. Union of India (2005) 8 SCC 351): Reiterating the above view, the Court observed that a void marriage “has to be ignored as not existing in law at all.” Yet, the Court acknowledged that while such marriages are legally void, parties often seek a formal declaration of nullity for clarity and record.
- A. Subash Babu v. State of Andhra Pradesh (2011) 7 SCC 616): This decision added a crucial nuance—though the law does not compel parties to seek a formal declaration of nullity, such a declaration is the prudent and intended course. Until such a declaration is made, the marital relationship continues to subsist in the eyes of the law, particularly for criminal proceedings under Section 494 IPC (bigamy).
Allahabad High Court relied heavily on the ratio in Subash Babu, observing that it would be dangerous and socially destabilising to allow individuals to self-declare their marital status. The Court emphasised that personal declarations, settlements, or compromises cannot substitute judicial determination.
The Court’s Key Finding
In paragraph 15, the Bench articulated the core of its ruling:
“The declaration of the parties’ marital status strikes at the very core of society. Declaration in the light of Section 11 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 can be made only by a competent court of law in an appropriate proceeding by and between the parties and in compliance with all other requirements of law.”
This observation encapsulates the Court’s firm stance—marital status is not a matter of private negotiation or self-determination. It has social, legal, and moral consequences extending beyond the parties involved, affecting inheritance rights, the legitimacy of children, and societal order. Therefore, only judicial pronouncements carry the force to determine or dissolve marital bonds.
Dismissal of the Recall Application
Having clarified the law, the Court turned to the specific relief sought. It noted that the Family Court judgment dated 6 May 2025 was passed after the compromise and writ order, and hence did not constitute sufficient ground to recall the High Court’s previous order.
The Bench held that subsequent judicial developments cannot invalidate an earlier High Court order based on a lawful compromise unless fraud or suppression of facts is proved. Consequently, the recall application dated 27 May 2025 was rejected.
The Court concluded by noting that if any party feels aggrieved by the Family Court’s decision, the proper remedy lies in appeal or revision under the law, not in seeking recall of a settled writ order.
Legal and Social Significance
1. Reaffirming Judicial Supremacy in Marital Matters
The ruling reinforces that marital status—whether of marriage, nullity, or divorce—cannot be determined outside the judicial process. While parties may compromise or separate amicably, their personal agreement has no effect on legal status unless endorsed by a competent court.
This principle upholds the rule of law and prevents social anarchy that could arise if individuals unilaterally proclaimed themselves married, divorced, or single.
2. Impact on Interfaith and Conversion Marriages
The case also highlights the recurring legal and social complexities surrounding conversion-based marriages. The High Court’s cautious approach—declining to determine when the woman re-embraced Hinduism—underscores that conversion must be genuine and proved for the purposes of solemnising a Hindu marriage under Section 5 of the Act.
The Court indirectly reaffirmed that a Hindu marriage requires both parties to be Hindus at the time of solemnization; otherwise, it is void ab initio.
3. Separation Through Compromise Is Not Equivalent to Divorce
Many couples attempt to settle matrimonial disputes through private agreements declaring mutual separation and freedom to remarry. The Allahabad High Court clarified that such settlements do not dissolve a marriage in law.
Only a decree of divorce or nullity passed by a Family Court under the Hindu Marriage Act can achieve that effect.
This is consistent with prior precedents such as Hiral P. Harsora v. Kusum Narottamdas Harsora (2016) and Amardeep Singh v. Harveen Kaur (2017), which emphasised the mandatory judicial process in the dissolution of marriage.
4. Protection of Social Order and Rights of Third Parties
Marital status affects not only the couple but also children, heirs, and the community. The legitimacy of children, succession rights, and property transfers depends on the lawful existence or dissolution of marriage. By asserting that only courts can declare marital status, the High Court sought to preserve legal certainty and social stability.
Conclusion
The Allahabad High Court’s decision in Ketan Rastogi v. State of U.P. serves as a definitive restatement of law on an issue central to Indian society—the determination of marital status. The Court’s message is unequivocal:
“Marital status strikes at the very core of society; only a competent court can declare it.”
By rejecting the recall plea and reaffirming the sanctity of judicial determination, the Court reinforced the idea that no compromise, affidavit, or informal agreement can confer or dissolve the legal status of marriage.
This decision thus safeguards both individual rights and social order, ensuring that personal laws operate within the framework of judicial oversight. It stands as a vital precedent for cases involving interfaith marriages, conversion, and private settlements, reminding citizens that in matters of marriage and divorce, the courtroom—not the living room—remains the only forum of final authority.